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Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes

Abstract

This volume comprises a selection of papers prepared in connection with a high-level seminar on Law and Financial Stability held at the IMF in 2016. It examines, from a legal perspective, the progress made in implementing the financial regulatory reforms adopted since the global financial crisis and highlights the role of the IMF in advancing these reforms and charting the course for a future reform agenda, including the development of a coherent international policy framework for resolution and resolution planning. The book’s unique perspective on the role of the law in promoting financial stability comes from the contribution of selected experts and representatives from our membership who share their views on this subject.

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes

Abstract

1.1. A robust framework for cross-border supervision is of key importance to the Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC), which is Switzerland’s supervisory authority for banks as well as collective investment funds, securities firms, and securities exchanges.

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes

Abstract

A 1995 study by the IMF, frequently cited in writings on bank insolvency, concluded that almost three-quarters of IMF member countries encountered significant banking sector problems between 1980 and 1996.1 During the banking crisis in Asia, it was observed that a factor that aggravated the crisis was the absence of adequate mechanisms for dealing with insolvent banks.2 The existing legal framework proved inadequate and revealed the need for rules that were better adapted to the special nature of bank insolvencies. The debate regarding the necessity of special rules for banks is not new, but was already under way early in the 20th century when a wave of bank failures swept across the United States and Europe. The banking crisis of the 1930s led to the recognition that some form of oversight and control was necessary to protect national economies from financial instability and individual depositors against losses.

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regulatory agencies accountable not only to the government but also to the industry they supervise and the public at large, with examples from a range of countries.

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Les décideurs rechignent souvent à accorder l’indépendance aux agences qui réglementent et supervisent le secteur financier, car ils craignent que ces agences, avec leurs responsabilités et leurs pouvoirs étendus, puissent imposer leur loi. Cette brochure décrit les mécanismes permettant de garantir que ces agences soient redevables non seulement envers l'État, mais également envers le secteur qu'elles supervisent et envers le grand public, et propose des exemples de divers pays.

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regulatory agencies accountable not only to the government but also to the industry they supervise and the public at large, with examples from a range of countries.

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regulatory agencies accountable not only to the government but also to the industry they supervise and the public at large, with examples from a range of countries.

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regulatory agencies accountable not only to the government but also to the industry they supervise and the public at large, with examples from a range of countries.

Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes, Mr. Michael W Taylor, and Mr. Marc G Quintyn

Abstract

Las autoridades de política económica suelen ser renuentes a otorgar independencia a los organismos que regulan y supervisan el sector financiero debido al temor de que estos organismos, con responsabilidades y poderes de amplio alcance, puedan convertirse en una fuente normativa por sí mismos. Este folleto describe los mecanismos para que los organismos reguladores rindan cuentas no solo ante el gobierno sino también ante la industria que supervisan y el público en general, con ejemplos sobre una amplia gama de países.

Mr. Michael W Taylor, Mr. Marc G Quintyn, and Ms. Eva H. G. Hüpkes
Policymakers' uneasiness about granting independence to financial sector regulators stems to a large extent from the lack of familiarity with, and elusiveness of, the concept of accountability. This paper gives operational content to accountability and argues that it is possible to do so in a way that encourages and supports agency independence. The paper first elaborates on the role and purposes of accountability. Second, it shows that the unique features of financial sector supervision point to a more complex system of accountability arrangements than, for instance, the conduct of monetary policy. Finally, the paper discusses specific arrangements that can best secure the objectives of accountability and, thus, independence. Our findings have a wider application than financial sector supervision.