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Mr. Marc G Quintyn
If not carefully planned, the transition to indirect monetary policy instruments may result in a loss of control. The 1967-71 attempt in France failed because of a misconceived instrument-mix and sequencing. Credit controls, reintroduced in 1972, were only formally abolished in 1987. This paper attributes the successful 1987 reform to changes in the policy framework in the 1980s. The interest rate was already the key instrument because direct controls became less effective and because of the priority given to the exchange rate objective. Consequently, the 1987 transition was from pegging to guiding the interest rates. Empirical evidence underpins this interpretation.
Mr. Marc G Quintyn
In an indirect monetary policy framework, open market operations become the central bank’s main instrument. In the initial stages, when financial markets are still undeveloped, selection of a financial instrument for those operations and the design of supporting arrangements to ensure the central bank’s operational autonomy when using the instrument, are crucial issues. Based on theoretical arguments and experience of a sample of countries that embarked on financial reforms, this paper argues that government securities are the preferred instrument because of their better capacity to develop financial markets. The use of government securities, however, requires the most complex supporting arrangements.
Mr. Marc G Quintyn

If not carefully planned, the transition to indirect monetary policy instruments may result in a loss of control. The 1967-71 attempt in France failed because of a misconceived instrument-mix and sequencing. Credit controls, reintroduced in 1972, were only formally abolished in 1987. This paper attributes the successful 1987 reform to changes in the policy framework in the 1980s. The interest rate was already the key instrument because direct controls became less effective and because of the priority given to the exchange rate objective. Consequently, the 1987 transition was from pegging to guiding the interest rates. Empirical evidence underpins this interpretation.

Mr. Marc G Quintyn

This issue of F&D looks at the growing role of emerging markets. Analysis by the IMF's Ayhan Kose and Eswar Prasad, professor of trade policy at Cornell University, argues that their economic ascendance will enable emerging markets such as Brazil, China, India, and Russia to play a more significant part in global economic governance and take on more responsibility for economic and financial stability. And Vivek Arora and Athanasios Vamvakidis measure how China's economy is increasingly affecting the rest of the world not just its neighbors and main trading partners. In addition, F&D examines a variety of topics that are particularly relevant as the world struggles to shake off the crisis. Alan Blinder and Mark Zandi look at the positive effects of stimulus in the United States. Without it, they say, the United States would still be in recession. IMF researchers look at how countries can get debt under control, and what happens when government debt is downgraded. Other articles examine the human costs of unemployment, how inequality can lead over time to financial crisis, and what changes in the way banks do business could mean for the financial system. Two articles look at Islamic banking, which was put to the test during the global crisis and proved its mettle, and in Faces of the Crisis Revisited, we continue to track how the recession affected several individuals around the world. This issue of F&D profiles Princeton economic theorist Avinash Dixit in the regular People in Economics feature, and Back to Basics looks at externalities.

Mr. Marc G Quintyn

In an indirect monetary policy framework, open market operations become the central bank’s main instrument. In the initial stages, when financial markets are still undeveloped, selection of a financial instrument for those operations and the design of supporting arrangements to ensure the central bank’s operational autonomy when using the instrument, are crucial issues. Based on theoretical arguments and experience of a sample of countries that embarked on financial reforms, this paper argues that government securities are the preferred instrument because of their better capacity to develop financial markets. The use of government securities, however, requires the most complex supporting arrangements.